Adaptation experience to date demonstrates that using a locally appropriate combination of decision analysis, land use planning, public participation and conflict resolution approaches can help to address the governance challenges faced in responding to SLR (high confidence). Effective SLR responses depend, first, on taking a long-term perspective when making short-term decisions, explicitly accounting for uncertainty of locality-specific risks beyond 2050 (high confidence), and building governance capabilities to tackle the complexity of SLR risk (medium evidence, high agreement). Second, improved coordination of SLR responses across scales, sectors and policy domains can help to address SLR impacts and risk (high confidence). Third, prioritising consideration of social vulnerability and equity underpins efforts to promote fair and just climate resilience and sustainable development (high confidence) and can be helped by creating safe community arenas for meaningful public deliberation and conflict resolution (medium evidence, high agreement). Finally, public awareness and understanding about SLR risks and responses can be improved by drawing on local, indigenous and scientific knowledge systems, together with social learning about locality-specific SLR risk and response potential (high confidence). 4.4.4.2, 4.4.5, Table 4.9
This chapter assesses the literature published since the AR5 on past and future contributions to global, regional and ESL changes, associated risk to low-lying islands, coasts, cities and settlements, and response options and pathways to resilience and sustainable development along the coast. The chapter follows the risk framework of AR5, in which risk is assessed in terms of hazard, exposure and vulnerability (Cross-Chapter Box 1 Chapter 1; Box 4.1), and is structured as follows (Figure 4.1):
The Horizontal Jumps: Planning For Long Term Development Downloads Torrent
Despite the large uncertainty in late 21st century SLR, progress in adaptation planning and implementation is feasible today and may be economically beneficial. Many coastal decisions with time horizons of decades to over a century are made today (e.g., critical infrastructure, coastal protection works, city planning, etc.) and accounting for relative SLR can improve these decisions. Decision-analysis methods specifically targeting situations of large uncertainty are available and, combined with suitable planning, public participation and conflict resolution processes, can improve outcomes (high confidence; 4.4.4.2, 4.4.4.3). For example, adaptation pathway analysis recognises and enables sequenced long-term decision making in the face of dynamic coastal risk characterised by deep uncertainty (medium evidence, high agreement; 4.4.4.3.4). The use of these decision-analysis tools can be integrated into statutory land use or spatial planning provisions to formalise these decisions and enable effective implementation by relevant governing authorities (4.4.4.2).
SLR responses refer to legislation, plans and actions undertaken to reduce risk and build resilience in the face of SLR (see Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1). These responses range from protecting the coast, accommodating SLR impacts, retreating from the coast, advancing into the ocean by building seawards and EbA (Box 4.3). Identifying the most appropriate way to respond to SLR is not straightforward and is politically and socially contested with a range of governance challenges (also called barriers) arising. This section first assesses the post-AR5 literature on the different types of SLR responses (i.e., protection, accommodation, advance, retreat and EbA) in terms of their effectiveness, technical limits, costs, benefits, co-benefits, drawbacks, economic efficiency and barriers, and the specific governance challenges associated with each type of response (Section 4.4.2). It then identifies a set of overarching governance challenges that arise from the nature of SLR, such as its long-term commitment and uncertainty, and the associated politically and socially contested choices that need to be made (Section 4.4.3). Next, planning, public participation, conflict resolution and decision analysis approaches and tools are assessed that, when applied in combination, can help to address the governance challenges identified, facilitating social choices about SLR responses (Section 4.4.4). Finally, enablers and lessons learned from practical efforts to implement SLR responses are assessed (Section 4.4.5), concluding with a synthesis emphasising the utility of climate resilient development pathways (Section 4.4.6).
There is limited evidence of migration occurring directly as a consequence of impacts associated with environmental change generally and SLR specifically. Research examining the linkages between migration and environmental change has been conducted in the Pacific (Connell, 2012; Janif et al., 2016; Perumal, 2018), South Asia (Szabo et al., 2016; Call et al., 2017; Stojanov et al., 2017), Latin America (Nawrotzki and DeWaard, 2016; Nawrotzki et al., 2017), Alaska, in North America (Marino and Lazrus, 2015; Hamilton et al., 2016) and Africa (Gray and Wise, 2016). While some limited evidence was found on population movement inland associated with shoreline encroachment in Louisiana, USA (Hauer et al., 2018), this research emphasises that the relationship between climate change impacts including SLR and migration is more nuanced than suggested by simplified cause-and-effect models (Adger et al., 2015). Migration is driven by a large number of individual, social, economic, political, demographic and environmental push and pull factors (Black et al., 2011; Koubi et al., 2016), interwoven with mega-trends such as urbanisation, land use change and globalisation, and is influenced by development and political practices and discourses (Bettini and Gioli, 2016; Cross-Chapter Box 7). For example, asset endowed individuals and households are more able to migrate out from flood-prone areas (Milan and Ruano, 2014; Logan et al., 2016), while the poorest households are significantly susceptible to material and human losses following an extreme event or disruptive environmental change (Call et al., 2017). Individual and social drivers include perceptions of environmental change (Koubi et al., 2016), formed by both direct experience of change and indirect information from social networks, mass media and governmental agencies. Environmental factors include the longer term impacts of climate variability and change, which can erode the capacity of ecosystems to provide essential services such as availability of freshwater, soil fertility and energy production acting as a threat multiplier for other drivers of migration(Hunter et al., 2015; McLeman, 2018).
Time horizon and uncertainty: The long-term commitment to SLR (Section 4.2.3.5) and the large and deep uncertainty about the magnitude and timing of SLR beyond 2050 (Section 4.4.4.3.2), challenge standard planning and decision making practises for several reasons (high confidence; Peters et al., 2017; Pot et al., 2018; Hall et al., 2019; Hinkel et al., 2019). The time horizon of SLR extends beyond usual political, electoral and budget cycles. Furthermore, many planning and decision making practices strive for predictability and certainty, which is at odds with the dynamic risk and deep uncertainty characterising SLR (Hall et al., 2019). Tensions can arise between established risk-based planning that seeks to measure risk, and adaptation responses that embrace uncertainty and complexity (Kuklicke and Demeritt, 2016; Carlsson Kanyama et al., 2019). For example, tensions arise because of the mismatch between the relative inflexibility of existing law and institutions and the evolving nature of SLR risk and impacts (Cosens et al., 2017; Craig et al., 2017; DeCaro et al., 2017). Possible limits of in situ responses to ongoing SLR (e.g., protection and accommodation), bring into question prevailing legal approaches to property rights and land use regulation (Byrne, 2012). In addition, because uncertainty about SLR makes it difficult to decide when to wait and when to act, public actors fear being held accountable for misjudgments (Kuklicke and Demeritt, 2016). The long time horizon and uncertainty of SLR make it difficult to mobilise political will and the leadership required to take visionary action (Cuevas et al., 2016; Gibbs, 2016; Yusuf et al., 2016; Yusuf et al., 2018b).
Social conflict: Ongoing SLR could become a catalyst for possibly intractable social conflict by impacting human activities, infrastructure and development along low-lying shorelines (high confidence). Social conflict refers here to the non-violent struggle between groups, organisations and communities over values, interests, resources, and influence or power, whereby parties seek to achieve their own goals, and may seek to prevent others from realising their goals and possibly harm rivals (Coser, 1967; Oberschall, 1978; Pruitt et al., 2003). SLR impacts that could contribute to conflict include: disruptions to critical infrastructure, cultural ties to the coast, livelihoods, coastal economies, public health, well-being, security, identity and the sovereignty of some low-lying island nations (Sections 4.3.2.4, 4.3.3.2, 4.3.3.6; Mills et al., 2016; Yusuf et al., 2016; Nursey-Bray, 2017; Hinkel et al., 2018). SLR responses inevitably raise difficult trade-offs between private and public interests, short- and long-term concerns, and security and conservation goals, which are difficult to reconcile due to divergent problem framing, interests, values and ethical positions (Eriksen et al., 2015; Foerster et al., 2015; Mills et al., 2016; Termeer et al., 2017; Sovacool, 2018). To some countries, SLR presents a security risk due to the scale of potential displacement and migration of people (Section 4.4.2.6). Climate change, and rising seas in particular, could compound sociopolitical stressors (Sovacool et al., 2015), challenge the efficacy of prevailing legal processes (Byrne, 2012; Busch, 2018; Setzer and Vanhala, 2019), and spark or escalate conflict (Lusthaus, 2010; Nursey-Bray, 2017). 2ff7e9595c
ความคิดเห็น